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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
As provided by statute, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Did the district court err in determining that the UDOT notice of interest was not a 
lien on Appellants' real property? Did the district court err in ruling that the notice of 
interest was not a wrongful lien? Did the district court err in ruling that Appellants 
cannot recover damages from UDOT? Did the district court err in finding that the State 
of Utah is immune from suit? Did the district court err in dismissing Appellants' claims 
based upon bona fide purchaser? Did the district court err in not addressing Appellants' 
constitutional claims? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard for review for this matter is that the appellate court should give no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions of law and review the legal conclusions reached 
by the trial court for correctness. See, Kenny v. Rich, 186 P.3d 989, 997 (Utah App. 
2008) Findings of fact are set aside if they are found to be clearly erroneous by the 
appellate court. See, Ockey v. Lehmer 189 P.3d 51, 59-60 (Utah 2008). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS WHOSE 
INTERPRETATION ARE DETERMINATIVE 
None. 
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STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATIONS ARE DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-103 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: (1) the 
subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for valuable 
consideration; and (2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1(2) 
"Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real property who offers a 
document for recording or filing with any county recorder in the state asserting a 
lien or other claim of interest in certain real property. 
Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1(6) 
"Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is 
recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of 
the real property. 
Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-4(1) 
A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien as defined in 
Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder against 
real property is liable to a record interest holder for any actual damages 
proximately caused by the wrongful lien. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-40-1 
Action to determine adverse claim to property - Authorized. An action may be 
brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real 
property or an interest or claim to personal property adverse to him, for the 
purpose of determining such adverse claim. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-40-2 
Lis pendens. In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real 
property the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter, and the 
defendant at the time of filing his answer when affirmative relief is claimed in 
such answer, or at any item afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the 
county in which the property or some part thereof is situated a notice of the 
pendency of the action, containing the names of the parties, the object of the action 
or defense, and a description of the property in that county affected thereby. From 
the time of filing such notice for record only shall a purchaser or encumbrancer of 
the property affected thereby be deemed to have constructive notice of the 
pendency of the action, and have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, 
and only of its pendency against parties designated by their real names. 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-30d-201 etseq (2006) 
Due to the length of this statue it is included in Appendix 9 hereto. 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-30d-301 etseq (2006) 
Due to the length of this statue it is included in Appendix 9 hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
When Appellants were attempting to sell their real property in Uintah, Utah during 
calendar year 2006, they became informed that UDOT claimed an interest in their 
property by virtue of an old condemnation order dated January 28, 1974. In furtherance 
of its claim, UDOT recorded a notice of interest on the Kappos residential property on 
January 19, 2006. Because the Kapposes obtained title to the subject property from was a 
bona fide purchaser for value, the State had no valid claim on their property and should 
not have recorded a notice of interest. The notice of interest recorded by UDOT wholly 
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prevented them from selling their property. The purpose of this action is for Appellants 
to seek damages from UDOT for its wrongful notice of interest. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The property which is the subject matter of this appeal is owned by Mark 
and Mala Kappos and is located at 1577 East 6850 South, Uintah, Weber County, Utah 
("the subject property"). R. 204. 
2. The subject property includes two parcels: Parcel Number 07-540-0002 
(hereinafter referred sometimes as "the home lot") and 07-107-0026 (parcel behind lot 
and next to Weber River hereinafter references sometimes as "the river parcel"). The 
home lot and the river parcel are both owned by Appellants. R. 204-05. See also, 
Appendix "1" which shows plat map generated by Weber County which demonstrate the 
location of these two parcels. 
3. On or about November 15, 2005 the Kapposes listed their property for sale 
with Coldwell Banker, a real estate brokerage. R. 131, Affidavit of Mala Kappos f7. 
4. UDOT recorded a notice of interest as of January 19, 2006 on both of the 
above properties owed by Appellants. R. 217-18. See also Appendix "2". 
5. After attempting to sell their property, the Kapposes were informed through 
an agent of UDOT that they could not sell their property because of an alleged prior 
eminent domain proceeding. R. 131. 
6. At that same time the Kapposes were informed that on Januaiy 16, 2003, 
the State of Utah Department of Transportation recorded a final order of condemnation 
dated January 28, 1974. R. 131-32. 
7. The Kapposes became unable to sell their property to anyone because of the 
notice of interest recorded by the State of Utah two months after listing their property for 
sale. R. 132-33, Affidavit of Mala Kappos paragraphs 10 through 17. Also, R. 144, 
Affidavit of Shauna Larsen. 
8. UDOT has failed to set forth a sufficient reason for asserting the notice of 
interest on the property of the Appellants. R. 205. 
9. UDOT did not record a similar notice on any of the Appellants' neighbors 
who had the same chain of title. R. 826-33 and R. 210-11. 
10. Prior to the above course of events, Appellants had purchased the home lot 
from Ed Green Construction, Inc. with a recording date of August 9, 2001. R. 185, 
Affidavit of Ed Green ^ 11 and R. 822. 
11. Ed Green Construction, Inc. previously acquired title to the Kappos home 
lot from Edwin Higley with a recording date of June 1, 2000. R. 185, Affidavit of Ed 
Green f 8, also R. 817-18. 
12. With a recording date of August 26, 2002, the Kapposes received title to 
the river parcel from Ed Green. R. 185, Affidavit of Ed Green f 12 and R. 824. 
13. Ed Green previously acquired title to the river parcel from Edwin Higley 
with a recording date of May 10, 2000. R. 185, Affidavit of Ed Green %9 and R. 820. 
14. Ed Green paid $175,000.00 to Edwin Higley for the purchase of the subject 
parcels. R. 185-86, Affidavit of Ed Green %7, and R. 848. 
15. Ed Green had no knowledge of a prior conveyance of the subject property 
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by Edwin Higley to the State of Utah. R. 185-86, Affidavit of Ed Green ^  15, and R. 329. 
16. The recording of the above condemnation order took place approximately 
29 years after the condemnation allegedly took place. R. 220-26. 
17. As a result of the notice of interest recorded on January 19, 2006, The 
Kapposes were unable to sell the property, have been unable to re-finance the property, 
and have been unable to access any of their equity in the property. R. 131-32, Affidavit 
of Mala Kappos ffl[ 10-11. 
18. In March 2007, Appellants received an offer to purchase the property from 
Mark and Kimberly Lyon for the amount of $740,000.00. R. 776-90. 
19. Because the Kapposes could not convey free and clear title to said 
property, the sale failed to close. R. 769-70, Affidavit of Mark Kappos | f 7-9. 
20. Since the recording of the notice of interest, the fair markel value of the 
property dropped drastically to $500,000.00. R. 770, Affidavit of Mark Kappos ^ 9. 
21. Appellants had planned on using some of their home equity to invest. Had 
their equity been accessible to them and but for UDOT's notice of interest, they would 
have realized approximately $240,000 in additional value. Instead, that has now been 
lost due to the State's actions. R. 768-70, Affidavit of Mark Kappos 1JK 7-9. 
22. It was not until July 16, 2008 that the State of Utah released its notice of 
interest on the property. R. 761, Withdrawal of notice of interest. 
23. Based upon the above facts, the following is a historical timeline set forth 
for visual reference. 
Historical Timeline 
January 28 
1974 
Condemnation 
Judgment 
against Higley 
February 25 
1974 
Judgment 
recorded 
Davis 
County only 
May 10 
2000 
Higley 
Conveyance 
to Green 
river parcel 
June 1 
2000 
Higley 
Conveyance 
to Green 
home parcel 
August 9 
2001 
Green 
Conveyance 
to Kappos 
home parcel 
August 26 
2002 
Green 
Conveyance 
to Kappos 
river parcel 
January 16 
2003 
Condemnation 
Judgment 
recorded in 
Weber County 
January 19 
2006 
Notice of 
Interest 
recorded by 
UDOT 
2007 
Kapposes 
sale to 
Lyons fell 
through 
July 
2008 
Notice of 1 
Interest 
released by 
UDOT 
24. Based upon the above facts, the following is the chain of title for the 
respective parties: 
Kappos Chain of Title (Based Upon the Home Lot) 
Ed Higley to Ed Green Construction, Inc. ^ Ed Green Construction, Inc. to Kappos 
Date of Deed: June 1, 2000 
Recording Date: June 1, 2000 
Date of Deed: August 8,2001 
Recording Date: August 9,2001 
UDOT's Chain of Title 
Ed Higley to UDOT 
Date of Order: January 19, 1974 
Recording Date: January 16, 2003 
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 
Because UDOT failed to timely record its interest in the subject property, it had no 
valid basis to subsequently record a notice of interest regarding the Kappos property on 
January 19, 2006. The district court erred in determining that the UDOT notice of 
interest was not a lien on Appellants' property. The district court erred in ruling that the 
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notice of interest was not a wrongful lien. The district court erred in ruling that 
appellants cannot recover damages from UDOT. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
does not give UDOT immunity from this suit. The district court erred in granting 
UDOT's motion to dismiss the appellants' quiet title bona fide purchaser claim. The 
district court erred in not addressing appellants' constitutional claims. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE UDOT FAILED TO TIMELY RECORD ITS INTEREST IN 
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, IT HAD NO VALID BASIS TO 
SUBSEQUENTLY RECORD A NOTICE OF INTEREST ON THE 
KAPPOS PROPERTY ON JANUARY 19, 2006. 
The result of the above-mentioned facts was that both UDOT and Ed Green had 
received conveyances from Edwin Higley for transfer of the same real property. UDOT 
believed that it had acquired the subject property from Edwin Higley. Moreover, Ed 
Green believed that he acquired title to the same property from Edwin Higley. Both 
grantees appeared to have valid conveyances. The answer to the question of who has the 
superior claim to the title of real property in this situation is answered by Utah Code 
Annotated § 57-3-103 which provides as follows: 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as 
against any subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any 
portion of it, if: (1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property 
in good faith and for valuable consideration; and (2) the subsequent 
purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
Therefore, in Utah, the grantee who records its deed first obtains paramount title if he 
purchased in good faith. Based upon the above statute, there is a two part analysis. 
Under Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-103 it should first be determined who recorded their 
deed first and second it is determined whether or not the subsequent purchaser recorded 
their deed in good faith. 
With regard to the first question, it is undisputed that Ed Green and Ed Green 
Construction, Inc. recorded their deeds prior to the recording of the condemnation 
judgment in favor of UDOT. Ed Green Construction, Inc. recorded his conveyance of the 
home lot which he had obtained from Ed Higley on June 1, 2000 with the Weber County 
Recorder. R. 196-97. Ed Green previously acquired title from Ed Higley with regard to 
the river parcel and recorded his deed on May 10, 2000. R. 199. Ed Green then conveyed 
the home lot to Appellants as of a recording dated August 9, 2001 and the river parcel to 
the Appellants on August 26, 2002. R. 201-03. By contrast, UDOT waited to record its 
January 28, 1974 judgment that it had obtained from Ed Higley until January 16, 2003. 
R. 313-32 and R. 222-26. The recording of the above condemnation order took place 
approximately 29 years after the condemnation had allegedly occurred. But it is clear 
that Ed Green recorded his deeds to the same property prior to the recording of any 
interest which UDOT had claimed. 
The next inquiry according to Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-103 is whether or not 
the subsequent purchaser (Ed Green) purchased the property in good faith and for a 
valuable consideration. Ed Green had no knowledge of any prior conveyance of the 
subject property by Edwin Higley to the State of Utah. R. 185-86. A copy of the Real 
Estate Purchase Contract shows the consideration paid by Ed Green to Ed Higley is a part 
of the record ($175,000.00). R. 848 and R. 189-95. Interestingly, UDOT only recorded a 
notice of interest on Lot 2 of the subdivision and not on any of the other lots even though 
the condemnation order was recorded against those lots as well. R. 210-11. The same 
situation existed for all of the lots in the subdivision because Ed Higley had conveyed a 
much larger parcel through the condemnation procedure to UDOT than what was 
individually conveyed to each of the lot owners in the subdivision. 
It is undisputed that Ed Green paid valuable consideration for the purchase of the 
property from Ed Higiey and that he had no knowledge of any alleged prior sale between 
Higiey and the State of Utah. R. 185-86. As a result, he obtained bona fide purchaser 
status. The overwhelming weight of authority on this issue is that once a bona fide 
purchaser takes title to property he can pass it to the whole world free of the claims of the 
alleged first purchaser. See, case law from Utah's sisters states including W.W. 
Planning, Inc. v. Clark, 456 P.2d 406 (Ariz. App. 1969) (ruling that a bona fide purchaser 
can deliver good title to a grantee even if that grantee has notice of a prior adverse 
equity); First Interstate Bank of Sheridan v. First Wyoming Bank, 762 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 
1988) (holding that a bona fide purchaser may sell or convey property to persons who 
will then receive protections as a bona fide purchaser.); Sun Valley Land and Minerals, 
Inc. v. Burt, 853 P.2d 607 (Idaho App. 1993) (one who purchases with knowledge of a 
defect enjoys the same protection as the person from whom he purchased the property); 
Bailey v. Butner, 176 P.2d 226 (Nev. 1947) (finding that a subsequent purchaser from a 
bona fide purchaser enjoys bona fide purchaser protection status). See also, Summary of 
Utah Real Property Law, vol. 1, page 87, § 2.42 (BYU 1978). Thus, the Kapposes 
obtained title to the subject property from a bona fide purchaser, Ed Green. 
Based upon the foregoing, the State of Utah never had a claim to the subject 
properties after Ed Green recorded his deeds from Ed Higiey on May 10, 2000 and June 
1, 2000 because UDOT failed to record its 1974 condemnation order in Weber County 
prior to the recording of the property sales to Ed Green and Ed Green Construction, Inc., 
in the year 2000. Therefore, UDOT has no claim whatsoever to the subject property. 
UDOT lost that claim when Ed Higiey recorded his deeds in May 2000 and June 2000 
respectively. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
UDOT NOTICE OF INTEREST WAS NOT A LIEN ON APPELLANTS' 
PROPERTY. 
Appellants presented the above issues to the District Court by way of a motion for 
partial summary judgment. At the same time, the District Court considered UDOT's 
motion to dismiss. On or about June 15, 2007 the Second District Court issued a ruling 
entitled Ruling, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. R. 328-42 (which is also attached hereto as Appendix 3). The District Court 
set out elements to qualify for relief under the wrongful lien statute stating that a property 
owner must show that, "(a) the document at issue purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance; (b) the lien was "wrongful" as defined by the Act; and (c) the lien the 
wrongful at the time it was filed." R. 332. 
"The documents that were filed in this case do not purport to 
establish a lien or encumbrance as defined by the wrongful lien 
statutes. A lien is defined as "a legal right or interest that a creditor 
has in another property lasting usually until a debt or duty that it 
secures is satisfied." Black's Law Dictionary 941(7* Ed. 2004). An 
encumbrance is defined as "any interest in a third person consistent 
with a title in fee in the grantee, if such outstanding interest 
injuriously affects the value of the property." Hancock v. Planned 
Dev. Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 186 (Utah 1990). UDOT does not allege 
that it is a creditor, and it asserts an ownership interest in the 
property - an interest which is inconsistent with title in fee in the 
grantee. Therefore, UDOT has not filed a lien or encumbrance." R. 
332-33. 
In summary, the District Court concluded that the notice of interest recorded by UDOT 
on Appellants' property was not a lien or encumbrance. 
The standard of review which the Court should use in determining whether or not 
the District Court's legal conclusion on this issue is appropriate is the correctness 
standard. See, Kenny v. Rich, 186 P.3d 989, 997 (Utah App. 2008). The above case sets 
forth that the appellate court should give no deference to the trial court's conclusions of 
law and review the legal conclusions reached by the trial court for correctness. The legal 
conclusion that UDOT's notice of interest is not a lien or encumbrance is completely 
incorrect. The language of the notice of interest recorded by UDOT is "the undersigned, 
Utah Department of Transportation, State of Utah, does hereby assert and claim an 
interest in and to the following described property: [Both of Appellants parcels]." See, 
Appendix 2. The State of Utah had already recorded its Order of Condemnation on 
January 16, 2003 and therefore the recording of the notice of interest went outside the 
scope of the recording of the Order of Condemnation. Moreover, the effect of the 
recording of the notice of interest by UDOT defeated Appellants' attempts to sell the 
subject property. R. 132-33, R. 144, and R. 369-70. 
As a result of the notice of interest recorded by UDOT, the Kapposes could not 
sell their property, could not access the equity in their property and could not do anything 
whatsoever with the title thereto. The State of Utah should not be engaging in this type 
of conduct - recording baseless notices of interest on property of its citizens. The 
conduct of the State of Utah to record a notice of interest when UDOT had lost any rights 
of the property whatsoever pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-103 is blatantly 
wrong. UDOT knew what it was doing when it recorded the notice of interest on the 
Appellants' property and clearly made the calculated decision to record it only against the 
Appellants' property and not against any other property of any other lot owner in the 
same subdivision who had the same chain of title. R. 210-11. The conduct was 
specifically targeted at Appellants and has no basis whatsoever. Although all of the other 
owners identified on the plat Appendix 1 had the same chain of title through Ed Higley 
and Ed Green, UDOT did not record a notice of interest on their properties-just the 
Kapposes. R. 826-33. Any analysis of the situation would show that UDOT had lost any 
claim to the subject property by failing to record earlier than Ed Green's deeds from Ed 
Higley. Moreover, the statutory and case law concerning bona fide purchaser status is 
abundantly clear on this issue and UDOT should not have engaged in this conduct by 
virtue thereof. 
The District Court made a legal determination that the notice of interest did not 
constitute a lien or encumbrance. This legal conclusion is erroneous and this Court 
should correct that legal conclusion and direct the District Court to find that the notice of 
interest was a lien or encumbrance recorded by UDOT against the Appellants' property. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE NOTICE OF 
INTEREST WAS NOT A WRONGFUL LIEN. 
The notice of interest was clearly intended by the State of Utah to prevent 
Appellants from selling their property or doing anything with it. That result was 
achieved by UDOT in preventing Appellants from selling their property. R. 769-70. 
Because the final condemnation order of January 19, 1974 is of no effect as to the subject 
properties owned by the Kapposes, the notice of interest upon which the final 
condemnation order is based, is a wrongful lien. A notice of interest is in violation of 
Utah law. See, Russell v. Thomas, 999 P.2d 1244 (Utah App. 2000). 
In Russell, the parties entered into a contract requiring the buyer to pay the seller 
more than $500,000.00 for its interest in real property which included payment of certain 
amounts for lots to be developed and that a note would be secured by a trust deed and 
trust deed note to be recorded after closing of the construction loan and escrow 
arrangements were made. At no time did the real property owner in Russell convey to 
the lien claimant an interest in any of the lots. Notwithstanding, the claimant filed a 
notice of interest with the county recorder and the property owner filed a petition to clear 
title arguing that the Defendants had no legitimate legal claim to an interest in the 
properties and no contractual or legal right to file a so called "notice of interest". The 
Russell court agreed with the property owner and the issue went up on appeal. The Court 
of Appeals noted that the trial court engaged in summary proceedings as provided an 
Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1 et seq. The court stated "to file a notice of interest the 
person must minimally claim to have an interest in the land." Id. at 1247. The Russell 
court further stated that in order to determine whether a document conveys an interest in 
land, the court should look at the agreement between the parties. The court found that the 
agreement in question did not purport to convey an interest in land but was nothing more 
than a promise to do so at a later time. The appellate court concluded that the Defendants 
did not have an interest in the property, that the notice of interest could not be authorized 
under Utah Code Annotated § 57-9-4, and was therefore not exempted from the wrongful 
lien definition. Accordingly, the Russell court found that the notice of interest was a 
wrongful lien and that the Plaintiff was entitled to summary relief pursuant to the Utah 
Code Annotated § 38-9-7. 
Similarly in this case, there are no grounds for a notice of interest being recorded 
on the Kappos property and said document constitutes a wrongful lien under Utah Code 
Annotated § 38-9-1 and § 38-9-4. The order of condemnation was recorded 
approximately 29 years late and did not grant any rights to the State of Utah by virtue of 
its being recorded after a recording by a subsequent bona fide purchaser of the real 
property. Moreover, because the notice of interest is based upon the 1974 condemnation 
order, it violates Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-103. Based upon the foregoing, the notice 
of interest recorded by the State of Utah Department of Transportation on January 19, 
2006 was clearly a wrongful lien. Appellaints should be entitled to recover all of their 
damages under the wrongful lien section of Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1 et seq. 
Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1 as it existed at the time of the Court's decision 
states, "wrongful lien" means: 
"Any document that purports to create a lien or encumbrance on a 
owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is recorded 
or filed is not: (a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another 
state of federal statute; (b) authorized by or contained in an order or 
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in the state; or (c) 
signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner 
of the real property."1 
1 It is interesting to note that Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1(6) has since been amended to include the term "notice 
of interest" as a wrongful lien. 
While it may have been appropriate to record the Condemnation Order, it was completely 
illegal for UDOT to record the notice of interest because it did not meet any of these 
requirements. It is not expressly authorized by any statute. Moreover, the notice of 
interest is not authorized or contained in an order or judgment of a court of a competent 
jurisdiction especially given the fact that the judgment had already been recorded in 
2003. Finally, the notice of interest was not authorized by Appellants Mark and Mala 
Kappos. Therefore, the Court should remand this case to the Judicial District Court 
instructing the court to find that the notice of interest was a wrongful lien. 
The District Court made a legal determination that the notice of interest was not 
wrongful. This conclusion is erroneous and this Court should apply the standard of 
reviewing that conclusion for correctness set forth in the Kenny v. Rich case. This Court 
should direct the District Court to correct its erroneous legal conclusion and make a 
determination that the notice of interest recorded by UDOT was wrongful and that 
damages should be awarded under the wrongful lien statute. Utah Code Annotated § 38-
9-1 etseq. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLANTS 
CANNOT RECOVER DAMAGES FROM UDOT. 
The District Court ruled that Appellants cannot recover damages from UDOT. R. 
482-83. The standard of review with regard to this question is also that the Appellate 
Court should give no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law and should review 
the legal conclusions reached by the trial court for correctness. See, Kenny v. Rich, 186 
P.3d 989, 997 (Utah App. 2008). 
Appellants relied upon Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1 et seq. to claim damages as 
against UDOT. The District Court cited to the quiet title sections of Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-40-1 through 13 (1987) in determining that no monetary damages could 
be recovered by Appellants. R. 335. However, Appellants did not rely upon the quiet title 
statute to claim damages, rather Appellants were relying upon the wrongful lien statute of 
38-9-1 et seq. to recover damages as against UDOT. The wrongful lien statute does 
authorize damages and does not exclude the State of Utah. Thus, the District Court 
discounted the wrongful lien statute when making this ruling. 
Moreover, the District Court cited another case in refusing to grant damages. See, 
Jack Parson Companies v. Nield. 751 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1988). That case does not stand 
for the proposition that Appellants cannot obtain damages. This matter is distinguished 
from the Nield case because in this case UDOT clearly lost its right to claim any title to 
the property by failing to record its condemnation order in a timely manner. In the Nield 
case, a seller brought a quiet title action against a purchaser's assignee relating to a real 
estate purchase contract. The court eventually decided that damages could not be 
allowed in that action because quiet title actions do not include any remedies for refusing 
to release title. But the wrongful lien statute was not discussed in that case because it had 
no been enacted at the time of the facts at hand. Id. at 1134 fh.l. The Kapposes have 
invoked the wrongful lien statute and have asked the court for damages in addition to 
attempting to quiet title. Because Appellants asked the District Court to interpret the 
wrongful lien statute, the court cannot rely upon the quiet title statute to defeat their 
claims under the wrongful lien statute. Moreover, the District Court should not have 
dismissed Appellants' slander of title and defamation claims. R. 162 for the same 
reasons. 
UDOT's notice of interest is the direct cause of damages to Appellants. When 
UDOT recorded its Condemnation Order it was basically meaningless because it was 
obvious to all title searchers that it had been recorded late. But when UDOT determined 
that it was not successful in asserting its claim pursuant to the Condemnation Order, it 
went one step further and recorded the notice of interest on the Kappos property only. 
This conduct was wrongful and caused the Appellants significant damages including the 
loss of a valuable sale of their home. This Court should recognize the damages suffered 
by the Appellants and direct the District Court to make a determination as to the amount 
of those damages. 
V. THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT DOES NOT GIVE 
UDOT IMMUNITY FROM THIS SUIT. 
The District Court also erred in determining that the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act does not allow Appellants to obtain damages against UDOT. R. 482-83. 
"[IJmmunity is an affirmative defense which the defendant bears the burden of proving." 
Trujillo v. UDOT, 986 P.2d 754, 760 (Utah App. 1999). The Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act does not prevent claims for quiet title actions. See. Houghton v. 
Department of Health. 125 P.3d 860 (Utah 2005). 
The District Court concluded that UDOT has not waived its immunity for 
damages. R. 483. On the contrary, Utah Code Annotated § 63-30d-301(2) states that, 
"immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived... (b) as to any action brought 
to foreclose mortgages or other liens and real or personal property, to determine any 
adverse claim on real or personal property, or to obtain an adjudication about any 
mortgage or other lien that the governmental entity may have or claim on real or personal 
property." This action clearly deals with a claim of a governmental entity on private real 
property. Thus, although the court concluded that the State of Utah is immune from this 
lawsuit the result which it obtained was incorrect. 
The District Court further stated that the Supreme Court of Utah case of Tindlev v. 
Salt Lake City School District 116 P.3d 295 (Utah 2005) is dispositive and that UDOT 
by recording a notice of interest was engaged in a governmental function. Appellants 
disagree with this conclusion because in the Tindlev case the Supreme Court of Utah 
dealt with whether or not the Utah legislature could place a cap on damages in a situation 
where high school students were injured or killed in an automobile accident occurring on 
a return trip from out of state on an extracurricular activity. The Tindlev case only 
addressed the constitutionality of governmental immunity and did not discuss specific 
waivers and non-waivers of governmental immunity. 
The District Court stated that UDOT's actions of recording the notice of interest 
were within its governmental function. R. 483. But this conclusion is in error. 
Governmental immunity is not waived if the claim arises from a 
discretionary function, but governmental immunity is waived if the 
claim arises from an operational function. See, Johnson v. UDOT, 
133 P.3d 402, 407 (Utah 2006). The case law suggests that a 
discretionary function is made at the policy making level not at the 
operational level. See, Johnson v. UDOT, 133 P.3d 402, 407 (Utah 
2006). 
The discretionary function exception to waiver of governmental immunity from suit for 
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed from 
the scope of employment is limited to broad policy decisions requiring evaluation of 
basic governmental policy matters, not operational administrative acts. See, Health Care 
Services Group, Inc. v. Utah Department of Health, 40 P.3d 591, 598-99 (Utah 2002). 
There are many Utah cases which address the distinction between operational and 
discretionary functions. For instance, the design, capacity and construction of a city-wide 
drainage system was within the discretionary function exception to the Governmental 
Immunity Act. See, Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 
784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989) (finding that the design of a drainage system is a discretionary 
function but that decisions relating to operation and maintenance of the system may not 
have been made on the policy level and that the case should be remanded for factual 
determination). 
In Sandberg v. Lehman, 76 P.3d 699 (Utah App. 2003) the court dealt with the 
issue as to whether or not immunity would be allowed relating to the design and 
operation of a landfill. The parties agreed that the design and operation of the landfill 
was a governmental function but disagreed as to whether the discretionary function 
except of the Governmental Immunity Act applied to the facts of the case. The court 
stated that discretionary function immunity is a distinct and limited form of immunity 
that should be applied only when a plaintiff is challenging a governmental decision that 
involves a basic policy-making function. Id. at 702. In Sandberg the court concluded 
that the decisions leading to omission of safety features at a concrete pit were not the 
result of policy evaluation, judgment and expertise and further declined to extend the 
discretionary function immunity to those facts. Id. at 709. 
Discretionary function immunity should be confined to those decisions and acts 
occurring at the basic policy-making level and not extended to those acts and decisions 
taking place at the operational level. See, Carroll v. State Road Commission. 496 P.2d 
888, 891 (Utah 1972). The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that a government entity's 
policy-based decisions which are entitled to discretionary function immunity as 
distinguished with those that occur at the operational level are important to differentiate 
because "not every governmental action involving discretion is a discretionary function 
within the meaning of the Act." See, Trujillo, 986 P.2d 752, 758 (Utah App. 1999). 
Otherwise, "the exception would swallow the rule as almost all governmental decisions 
involve some discretion." Id. The decisions which are entitled to immunity are 
characterized "by the high degree of discretion and judgment involved in weighing 
alternatives and making choices with respect to public policy and planning." See, 
Keegan v. State. 896 P.2d 618, 625 (Utah 1995). Operational level decisions "concern 
routine, everyday matters, not requiring evaluation of broad policy factors." Id- at 623. 
A good illustration of this analysis is found in Johnson v. UDOT. 133 P.3d 402 
(Utah 2006). In that case, the court determined that the Department of Transportation's 
use of orange plastic barrels on highway construction project did not qualify for the 
discretionary exception to the waiver of governmental immunity under the Governmental 
Immunity Act. "While the judiciary strives not to interfere with governmental 
deliberations addressed by the political process, the government cannot escape liability 
by simply claiming that some discretion, however minimal, was used in making a 
decision." Id "The key... is that the government actually exercises a level of discretion 
in a manner that implicates policymaking and thrusts the decision into the political 
process." Id. 
In this case, the recording of UDOT's notice of interest on the Kappos real 
property was not a governmental policy, but an operational administrative act carelessly 
and negligently targeting the Appellants. This Court should find that governmental 
immunity does not apply to these facts. 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING UDOT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS THE APPELLANTS5 QUIET TITLE BONA FIDE 
PURCHASER CLAIM, 
UDOT recognized that its notice of interest had no valid basis and eventually 
released the notice of interest on its own volition on July 16, 2008 by recording its 
withdrawal of notice of interest concerning the subject property. R. 744. With that act as 
its sole basis and in re-arguing all of the issues pertaining to Utah Code Annotated § 57-
3-103, UDOT asked the District Court to dismiss Appellants' claim for quieting title to 
the property. While Appellants are appreciative that the State of Utah has released its 
notice of interest and that it did so voluntarily, such conduct only begs the question of 
whether or not damages should have been awarded. The District Court determined that 
no damages could be awarded and therefore rejected Appellants' arguments that although 
the release of notice of interest had quieted title to the property, still did not address the 
damages which UDOT had caused the Kappos family. R. 768-70. The Kappos family 
suffered a great deal as a result of the recording of the notice of interest by UDOT which 
was wrongful from its inception. The Kapposes had intended to move their family to a 
new location, downsize their home and send their children to different schools. R. 768-
70. The Kapposes had decided that moving to a new location would be better for their 
family. However, they could not sell their property and the sale of their property was 
actually defeated because of the notice of interest. R. 769-70. In addition, the Kapposes 
could not access any equity in their property during the extended period that the notice of 
interest was on the property. Moreover, the value of the property has; significantly 
dropped since the sale of the property which the Kapposes lost as a result of the notice of 
interest. R. 770. Most importantly, the Appellants lost an actual buyer of their property 
at a price of $740,000.00. R. 769-70. The damages to the Kapposes as a result of 
UDOT's actions are significant and have been completely discounted and overlooked by 
the District Court. This Court should review that decision and make a legal 
determination that the District Court erred in reaching that conclusion. Damages in this 
situation should be allowed. 
VII. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT ADDRESSING 
APPELLANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS. 
The District Court originally allowed Appellants to amend their complaint to 
allege constitutional issues. R. 526-27. However, by way of an order dated November 3, 
2008 the court dismissed Appellants constitutional takings claim, based on both the 
United States and Utah Constitutions without prejudice. R. 653-55. Later, after other 
issues in the case were resolved which are not being appealed, Appellants asked the court 
to reinstate the constitutional takings claim. In its decision filed March 1, 2010, the court 
determined that it would not reinstate Appellants' claim for constitutional taking even 
though it had been dismissed without prejudice. The court authorized Appellants to file a 
separate complaint to proceed with the constitutional takings claim. R. 1044-45. In a 
prior decision recorded October 27, 2009, while addressing UDOT's motion to dismiss 
the constitutional claim with prejudice, the District Court stated: 
Admittedly, the Court's prior Ruling on the Plaintiffs' Constitutional 
Taking Claims is ambiguous. But so were the Plaintiffs' initial 
pleadings. With very little help in analysis, from the Plaintiffs in 
regards to their claims, the court was left to guess as to the Plaintiffs' 
theories of recovery. The court, guessing that the issue of mistake 
might in some way shape or form be part of the Plaintiffs' 
constitutional taking claim, dismissed that claim without prejudice. 
It was anticipated by the, the Court, that the Plaintiffs would file an 
amended complaint clarifying their claim or theory of recover. The 
Plaintiffs did file an amended complaint clarifying their 
Constitutional Takings Claim. The issues raised by the Plaintiffs in 
their amended complaint and in their response to the Defendant's 
motion as sufficient to deny the Defendant's motion. R. 997. 
The court clearly felt that there was merit to Appellants' constitutional takings claim but 
refused to address it. The constitutional takings claim should have been addressed by the 
District Court in order to proceed on the basis of judicial economy rather than requiring a 
whole new lawsuit be filed when the judge was already familiar with the facts of the case. 
Based upon the foregoing, the District Court erred in not addressing Appellants' 
constitutional takings claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred in making numerous legal determinations which 
prevented Appellants from recovering damages from UDOT for its wrongful notice of 
interest. The wrongful notice of interest caused the Appellants significant harm for the 
period of time that it was hindering title to their property. Therefore, this Court should 
reverse the rulings of the District Court, allow Appellants to recover damages and direct 
the District Court to determine the amount of those damages. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j 2 g^day of October, 2010. 
SMITH KNOWLES, P.C. 
M. Darin Hammond 
Attorneys for Appellants Mark and Mala Kappos 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing OPENING 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS were mailed by first-class mail with postage fully prepaid 
this Qkfcft day of October, 2010, to each of the following: 
Nancy L. Kemp 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
Civil Appeals Division 
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APPENDIX 3 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
MARK KAPPOS and MALA KAPPOS, 
Plamtiffs, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant. 
Mis 
RULING, DEFENDANT'S^ MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 060902775 » 
Judge W. Brent West <n 
> 
In this quiet title action, the Defendant, the Utah Department of Transportation (UD(^), 
has moved to dismiss all the Plaintiffs' claims, arguing that the Plaintiffs have failed to comply 
with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (UGIA). Additionally, the Plaintiffs have moved for 
partial summary judgment, arguing that UDOT must release its notice of claim on their property. 
The Court will dismiss all of the Plaintiffs' remaining claims without prejudice except for the 
Plaintiffs' claim which seeks to quiet title due to a mistake in the condemnation order. The 
Court denies the Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
In 1974, UDOT obtained an order condemning Plaintiffs' properly (Plaintiffs' Complaint, 
Exhibit F), but it failed to record it m the appropriate county, Weber, for approximately 30 years. 
During this delay, Edwin Higley (the owner of the disputed property at the time UDOT 
condemned it), sold the same land, in at least two parcels-one to Ed Green Constmction Inc., and 
one to Ed Green individually. (Affidavit of Ed Green, Exhibits B & C). Mr. Green has stated, 
DECISION - COURT DENIES THE PLAILNTIFFS' MOTIOI 
and UDOT does not contest, that he knew nothing of UDOT's condemnation order, and he paid 
valuable consideration for both parcels of property. (Affidavit of Ed Green, Page 2, fflf 7 & 15). 
The Plaintiffs purchased these two parcels in 2001 and 2002, and they immediately recorded 
their deeds. (Affidavit of Ed Green, Exhibits D & E). 
UDOT recorded the condemnation order on January 14,2003, and then, it filed a notice 
of interest on the Plaintiffs' property on January 19,2006, (Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Exhibits B & C). Subsequently, the Plaintiffs filed a petition to nullify UDOT's 
documents pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1, et. seq (Wrongful Lien Statutes). (Petition, 
Case Number 060901882). The Honorable Michael D. Lyon ruled that the Plaintiffs did not 
qualify for relief under these provisions, because (a) at the time the UDOT filed its notice it was 
not wrongful; and (b) determining priority of title (between bona fide purchasers for value and 
title based on a condemnation order) is prohibited by the Wrongful Lien Statutes. (Order Dated 
May 8, 2006; 1f1f 17 & 18). 
As a result of this Order, the Plaintiffs filed this separate suit which included claims for 
(1) quiet title; (2) slander of title; and (3) defamation of title. (Complaint, Case Number 
060902775). The Plaintiffs' complaint provided aletemate bases for their quiet title claim-(a) 
Plaintiffs' title was superior to UDOT's due to their status as bona fide purchasers for value and 
(b) the condemnation order mistakenly included the description of the disputed property when 
another property was intended for inclusion. Id. UDOT filed a motion to dismiss arguing that 
(1) the Plaintiffs failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Utah Governmental 
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Immunity Act (UGIA), and (2) Plaintiffs' claims of slander and defamation of title were barred 
by UGIA. The Court entered an order dismissing the Plaintiffs' slander and defamation of title 
claims, because they are barred by the UGIA. 
However, the Court was unable to rule on the Plaintiffs' remaining claim(s)-quiet title, 
because it was unclear what the Plaintiffs were actually claiming. In the Plaintiffs' complaint, 
they sought monetary damages as a remedy to their quiet title claim-a remedy which is highly 
unusual in a quiet title claim. (Plaintiffs' Complaint, Page 8 t41). The Court's extensive 
research failed to uncover one case where a court awarded monetary damages pursuant to a quiet 
title cause of action. After reviewing the documentation in this case, it was apparent that the 
Plaintiffs were alleging that their damages were caused by UDOT's filing of the above-
referenced documents-not by its claim to the property. (Affidavit of Mala Kappos, Pages 2-3, ^[ 
10, 11, 13, & 14). Since the Court had not been informed of the Plaintiffs' previous petition to 
nullify a wrongful lien, this indicated that the Plaintiffs' quiet title claim was actually a hybrid of 
two different claims-one for wrongful lien and one for quieting title. 
The proper characterization of these claims (as a traditional quiet title, wrongful lien, or 
something else) was important, because equitable claims are exempt from the requirements of the 
UGIA, but legal claims are not. Without a proper understanding of the Plaintiffs' claim(s), the 
Court could not characterize the claim(s) as legal or equitable. Therefore, the Court could not 
conclude whether the Plaintiffs' quiet title claim was subject to the requirements of the UGIA-a 
conclusion that was necessary to rule on UDOT's motion to dismiss. 
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To do substantial justice, the Court requested that the Plaintiffs specify what cause(s) of 
action they were pursuing or to inform the Court that they needed more time for discovery. The 
Plaintiffs told the Court that they needed more time for discovery (Plaintiffs' Request to 
Complete Discovery), but subsequently, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment 
asking the Court to have UDOT remove its notice of interest-essentially, an action under the 
Wrongful Lien Statutes. 
In the hearing on the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiffs would not 
specify which claims they were making, and UDOT renewed its motion to dismiss. Due to these 
unusual circumstances, the Court will discuss the relationship between quiet title and wrongful 
lien actions, characterize the Plaintiffs' remaining quiet title claim(s), ascertain whether the 
Plaintiffs have stated claim(s) for which relief can be granted, and determine whether the 
Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed due to the failure to comply with the notice requirements 
oftheUGIA. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN QUIET TITLE AND WRONGFUL LIENS-THE 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS 
Quiet title actions are used to resolve disputes in which a party asserts an ownership 
interest in property which is invalid, or, it is used to determine which of two parties has superior 
title when more than one party has a valid claim to ownership. Nolan v. Hoopiiaina fin re 
Hoopiiaina Trust), 144 P.3d 1129,1137 (Utah 2006). Quiet title actions can also be used to 
remove a wrongful lien or encumbrance. Anderson v. Wilshire Invs., L.L.C.. 123 P.3d 393 (Utah 
2005). 
However, property owners who seek to remove a wrongful lien or encumbrance, may 
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have a second option-a petition under the Wrongful Lien Statutes. In the Wrongful Lien 
Statutes, the legislature has provided for an expedited procedure to resolve wrongful 
liens/encumbrances if certain requirements are met. One of the most important of these 
requirements is that the wrongful lien or encumbrance asserted by the plaintiff must meet the 
definition of wrongful under the Wrongful Lien Statutes-a definition which is much stricter than 
under traditional property law. If these requirements are not met, the party must pursue relief 
under traditional quiet title principles. 
Using this understanding of quiet title principles, relying on its previous observations, and 
the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the Court will construe the Plaintiffs' remaining 
quiet title claim as four different causes of action: (1) a wrongful lien under the Wrongful Lien 
Statutes, (2) quiet title due to a wrongful lien, (3) quiet title as UDOT's ownership claim is based 
on a mistake in the order of condemnation, and (4) quiet title due to the superiority of the 
Plaintiffs' title under the legal concept of a bona fide purchaser for value. 
WRONGFUL LIEN PURSUANT TO THE WRONGFUL LIEN ACT 
The Plaintiffs' claim for a wrongful lien pursuant to the Wrongful Lien Statutes fails to 
state a claim for which relief can be granted. To qualify for relief under the Wrongful Lien 
Statutes, a property owner must show that (a) the document at issue purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance; (b) the lien was "wrongful" as defined by the Act; and (c) the lien was wrongful at 
the time it was filed. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-7. The Plaintiffs' claim fails to met any of these 
requirements. 
The documents that were filed in this case do not purport to establish a lien or 
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encumbrance as defined by the Wrongful Lien Statutes. A lien is defined as ua legal right or 
interest that a creditor has in another's property lasting usually until a debt or duty that it secures 
is satisfied." Black's Law Dictionary 941 (7th ed. 2004). An encumbrance is defined as "any 
interest in a third person consistent with a title in fee in the grantee, if such outstanding interest 
injuriously affects the value of the property." Hancock v. Planned Dev. Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 186 
(Utah 1990). UDOT does not allege that it is a creditor, and it asserts an ownership interest in 
the property-an interest which is inconsistent with title in fee in the grantee. Therefore, UDOT 
has not filed a lien or encumbrance. 
Even if UDOT had been asserting a lien/encumbrance, it would not have been wrongful 
under the Wrongful Lien Statues. The Act states that a lien is not wrongful if it was authorized 
by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in the state. Utah 
Code Ann. §38-9-l(6)(b). Since the condemnation order authorized UDOT to take the property, 
it is not wrongful under the Wrongful Lien Statutes. 
The Plaintiffs cannot show that UDOT's documents were wrongful at the time they were 
recorded. The Plaintiffs have asserted that UDOT's condemnation order and its notice of interest 
were wrongful at the time they were filed, because by the time these documents were recorded 
the Plaintiffs' title to the property was superior to UDOTs under the legal concept of bona fide 
purchaser for value. Under Utah Code Ann. §57-3-103 a party that fails to record a document 
which conveys property to it, risks losing its claim to that property if (a) the original owner sells 
the same property to a second party; (b) the second party purchased the property in good faith; (c) 
the second party paid valuable consideration for the property; and (d) the second party records its 
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deed before the first buyer. While the Plaintiffs may eventually be able to prove that they are 
bona fide purchasers for value, they had not done so when UDOT filed its documents. At this 
time (and at the time UDOT filed) it is plausible that the Plaintiffs will not be able to establish 
that they are bona fide purchasers for value-rendering their claim to the property invalid. 
Therefore, UDOT's recording was not wrongful at the time it filed. 
Since the Plaintiffs' claim does not meet any of the requirements for relief under the 
Wrongful Lien Statutes, their claim under the Wrongful Lien Statutes fails to state a claim for 
relief. 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR QUIET TITLE DUE TO A WRONGFUL LIEN 
The documents recorded in this case are not liens or encumbrances. (See discussion 
supra, Wrongful Lien Pursuant to the Wrongful Lien Act, ^ 3). Therefore, the Plaintiffs' claim 
for quiet title due to a wrongful lien fails to state a claim for relief. 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR QUIET TITLE DUE TO A MISTAKE IN THE ORDER 
CONDEMNING PROPERTY AND SUPERIORITY OF PLAINTIFFS5 TITLE 
The Plaintiffs have stated claims for relief in their claim for quieting title due to a mistake 
in the order condemning the property and their claim that their title is superior due to the legal 
concept of bona fide purchasers for value. However, the Plaintiffs may not request monetary 
damages as a part of these claims. 
Since the Plaintiffs' quiet title claim included an unusual request for monetary damages 
as a remedy, one of the pivotal issues in this case, is whether traditional quiet title principles 
allow a plaintiff to recover monetary damages. The Court concludes that a plaintiff may not 
receive monetary damages for a traditional quiet title cause of action. Rather, if a plaintiff in a 
Ruling, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
Case Number 060902775 
Page 7 of 14 
quiet title action seeks damages, he/she must plead and prove an additional cause of action which 
authorizes damages as a remedy. 
The plain language of the statutes which authorize a quiet title action and the case of Jack 
B. Parson Companies v. Nield. 751 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1988) support this conclusion. In Nield, the 
defendant provided money for a company's down payment on a land sales contract in which 
plaintiff was the seller. In exchange, the defendant received an assignment of the company's 
rights in the real estate contract-an assignment he recorded. When the company defaulted, the 
defendant refused to redeem the property or release his assignment, as the plaintiff requested, for 
approximately eight months. This refusal resulted in financial damage to the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff filed suit claiming a cause of action in quiet title and one in wrongful refusal to cleanse 
title, hi overturning the trial court's award for damages for wrongful refusal to cleanse title, the 
Nield court stated; "[tjhere is no basis in law for this award. Quiet title actions are statutory in 
nature, and Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-40-1 through -13 (1987), authorizing quiet title actions, does 
not include any remedies for refusing to release title." Id- at 1133 (internal citations omitted). 
Further, the Nield court explained that at common law, there was no action for refusal to cleanse 
title. "This Court held that there was no affirmative duty to release the lien and that 'at the 
common law, no action for damages would lie because of a refusal to release a mortgage or 
discharge a lien or claim against property.'" Id. at 1134 (internal citations omitted). 
A review of the current statute shows that it still does not include a remedy for refusing to 
release title-only for the wrongful withholding of property. Based on the plain language of the 
current statute and the language in Nield, the Court concludes that a plaintiff is not allowed to 
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recover monetary damages in a quiet title action, nor are they allowed to recover monetary 
damages for a cause of action which is similar to wrongful refusal to cleanse title. 
The Nield case closely parallels this action-the Plaintiffs, in this case, seek an order 
quieting title in the land and damages for UDOT's refusal to release its recorded documents. As 
in Nield, the party clouding title, UDOT, originally had the authority to file its documents which 
clouded the property owner's title. (See discussion supra. Wrongful Lien Pursuant to the 
Wrongful Lien Act f 5). The Plaintiffs, in this case, also requested that UDOT release title, but 
UDOT refused. (Plaintiffs' Complaint, Page 6, f 32). According to the Plaintiffs affidavit, the 
monetary damages incurred by the Plaintiffs resulted from this refusal-not from UDOT's claim. 
(Affidavit of Mala Kappos, Pages 2-3, ffi[ 10, 11, 13, & 14). While the Plaintiffs have not alleged 
a separate cause of action such as wrongful refusal to cleanse title, their request for damages is 
essentially the same as the wrongful refusal to release damages in Nield-they are alleging the 
same type of damages and asking for compensation. Since Nield has prohibited claims which are 
similar to the wrongful refusal to release filed documents, the Plaintiffs' request for monetary 
damages is not allowed. Therefore, the Plaintiffs' may not request monetary damages as a part 
of their quiet title action. 
PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH UGIA'S NOTICE REQUIREMENTS 
UDOT has argued that, even if the Plaintiffs have stated a claim for relief, the Plaintiffs' 
failure to comply with the UGIA's notice requirements should result in a dismissal, because 
failure to comply with the UGIA's notice requirements divests the Court of subject matter 
jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs have argued that their quiet title claim is an equitable claim which is 
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not subject to the UGIA's notice requirements, but they also assert that they gave notice. 
Equitable claims are exempt from UGIA's notice requirements. American Tierra Corp. v. 
West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1992). However, if a claim is subject to the UGIA, failure 
to strictly comply with the UGIA's notice requirements divests a court of subject matter 
jurisdiction over a plaintiffs claim(s). Davis v. Cent. Utah Counseling Ctr.. 147 P.3d 390, 399 
(Utah 2006). Therefore, the Court must determine whether a quiet title claim is legal or 
equitable.1 
As construed earlier, the Plaintiffs have stated two different "quiet title" actions. The first 
alleges that UDOT should never have received title to the property, because the condemnation 
order mistakenly included the description of the disputed property when a different property 
should have been included. The second alleges that the Plaintiffs have superior title to UDOT, 
because they are bona fide purchasers for value. These are two different cause of action. In 
Nolan v Hoopiiaina (In Re Hoopiiaina Trust), the Supreme Court of Utah distinguished between 
"true quiet title actions" which seek to perfect a party's title against adverse claims and other 
quiet title actions which seek the remedy of quieting title, but do so on the basis other than the 
perfection of title from an adverse claim, i.e., fraud, mistake, accident, etc. 144 P.3d 1129, 1135-
38 (Utah 2006). The Plaintiffs' claim that they are bona fide purchasers for value is a true quiet 
title action, and their claim that there was a mistake in the judgment is a not true quiet title 
action-it is an action to reform a judgment based on a mistake. 
1
 The Court recognizes that the Plaintiffs' complaint also stated claims for slander and defamation of 
title-claims that were dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. While UDOT's motion 
to dismiss based on the Plaintiffs' failure to follow the notice of claim requirements could apply to these claims, the 
Court will not address its applicability, because these claims have already been dismissed. 
Ruling, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs5 Motion for Summary Judgment 
Case Number 060902775 
Page 10 of 14 
Plaintiffs' claim that there was mistake in the judgment is an equitable action. Mistake in 
a judgment or order due to a "mistake of fact or false assumption may be grounds for relief under 
rule 60(b)(7) or pursuant to an independent action in equity regardless of the length of time that 
has passed." Gillmor v. Wright. 850 P.2d 431,435 (Utah 1993) (Internal Quotation Omitted). 
Here, the Plaintiffs have filed a separate action. It is one in equity. Therefore, it is exempt from 
the UGIA's notice requirements. 
However, the Plaintiffs' claim that they are bona fide purchasers for value is a legal 
claim. In Holland v Wilson. 327 P.2d 250 (Utah 1958), the Supreme Court of Utah decided that 
a party in a quiet title action is entitled to a jury, because quiet title claims are legal. "This court 
has already held that an action to quiet title is an action at law and either side upon request is 
entitled to a jury trial." Id at 251. The Court continued; 
We are further of the opinion that although historically an action to quiet title was 
originally equitable and the law courts had no jurisdiction to grant such relief, that 
situation does not prevail in this state. Formerly the equity courts afforded relief 
because there was no adequate remedy at law. In this jurisdiction, however, there 
is an adequate remedy provided by statute under the provisions of Chapter 40 of 
Title 78, U.C.A. 1953. 
Id at 252. In another quiet title case, Babcock v Dangerfield, 94 P.2d 862, (Utah 1939), the 
Supreme Court of Utah stated, "it is clear from the pleadings in this case that the action is one at 
law and therefore that a jury trial should have been granted." (Internal Citations Omitted). 
Given this case law, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs' quiet title claim was a legal cause of 
action. Therefore, they must have strictly complied with the UGIA's notice requirements or the 
Court will be divested of subject matter jurisdiction to consider their claims. 
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The Court finds that the Plaintiffs did not provide appropriate notice, because it did not 
deliver a notice of claim to the Utah Attorney General (attorney general) before filing suit.2 The 
UGIA requires that a notice of claim must be sent to the entity before maintaining an action, Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-12 and Utah Code Ann, § 63-30d-401. Additionally, a claimant must deliver 
the notice of claim to both the entity and the attorney general within one year after the claim 
arose. See, Utah Code Ann § 63-30-12 and Utah Code Ann § 63-30d-402. Usually, a plaintiff 
would comply with these requirements by filing a notice of claim with the attorney general and 
the entity within one year, and then he/she would file suit. 
However, the Plaintiffs' quiet title claim muddies the time requirements for filing notice 
of claim with the attorney general. The UGIA specifies that a claim arises when the statute of 
limitations would begin to run against a private person. See, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 and 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401. Since the statute of limitations does not apply to "true quiet title 
actions," such as the Plaintiffs bona fide purchaser for value claim, Nolan v Hoopiiaina fin Re 
Hoopiiaina Trust), 144 P.3d 1129, 1135-38 (Utah 2006), the one year requirement does not 
apply. Therefore, if a plaintiff was asserting a quiet title claim, it would have to deliver a notice 
of claim to the entity before it filed suit, but there would be no deadline to deliver the notice of 
claim to the attorney general's office-even though the UGIA requires that the attorney general 
receive notice of claim. 
This case demonstrates this problem. The Plaintiffs sent a letter to Diane McGuire, a real 
estate specialist, with the Utah Department of Transportation, on March 3, 2006-before they 
2Different versions of the UGIA was passed after UDOT filed the condemnation order in January, 2003 and 
before it filed a notice of interest in January, 2006. The notice requirements do not differ in material ways. 
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filed. However, they did not send the notice to the attorney general's office until October 17, 
2006-after they filed suit. Therefore, the attorney general was not notified as required before 
this case was filed. 
Because of this ambiguity in the statute, the Court looks to the intent of the statute, and it 
concludes that such a plaintiff in a quiet title action must serve the attorney general before it files 
suit. The UGIA clearly intends that a plaintiff send two notices-one to the entity and one to the 
attorney general. Lamarr v. Utah State DOT. 828 P.2d 535, 540-41 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The 
purpose of serving the attorney general is to ensure that the State's legal needs are met. Brittain 
v. State bv & Through Utah Dep't of Employment Sec. 882 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
If there is no deadline for a plaintiff in a quiet title action to notify the attorney general, it would 
contravene the statute's intent to ensure that the State's legal needs are met. Therefore, a 
plaintiff in a quiet title action, must send its notice of claim to the attorney general before it files 
suit. Since the Plaintiffs in this case failed to file a notice of claim with the attorney general until 
after they filed suit, there claim to quiet title due to their bona fide purchaser for value statute is 
dismissed without prejudice. 
The Court also finds that the notice of claim that the Plaintiffs sent before they filed suit 
was not sufficient, because it was not sent to the appropriate person at UDOT. The letter the 
Plaintiffs sent was addressed to Diane McGuire, a real estate specialist. Under Rule 4 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, service on a state agency must be made by serving any member of 
its governing board, its executive employee, or its executive secretary. Since the letter Plaintiffs' 
sent was not directed to any of these parties, the Plaintiffs' notice of claim was insufficient. 
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Since the Plaintiffs failed to provide adequate notice of claim, the Court dismisses all of 
the Plaintiffs' claims except for its claim to quiet title due to a mistake in the condemnation 
order. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is denied. The motion seeks to have 
UDOT's recorded documents removed under the Wrongful Lien Statutes, because they are 
wrongful. As discussed infra, the UDOT's claim is not a lien or encumbrance, and at this time, it 
is not clear whether UDOT's claim is wrongful. (See discussion supra Wrongful Lien Pursuant 
to the Wrongful Lien Act, ^  5). Therefore, the Court denies the motion. 
Ms. Lui will prepare an order for the Court's signature. 
Dated this >H - day of June, 2007 _ ^ 
W. Brent West, Judge 
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appearing of record and taxes for the year 2000 and each year thereafter. 
WTTNESS the hand of said grantors, this lday of June; 2000. 
Signed in the presence of 
Edwin M. Higley 
STATE OF UTAH, 
ss 
COUNTY OF DAVIS 
On the I day of June, A.D. 2000 personally appeared before me Edwin M. Higley 
the signer of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same;-; 
Notary Pabiic 
My Commission Expires^ . My Residence is 
/$%* M h Vv "JT 
tLr— 
NOTARY PUBUC 
EDWARD D. DAYTON 
9ftW£$T 2S28 SOUTH 
SYRACUSE, UT €4076 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 
OCTOOER 7TH, 2003 
STATE Of UTAH 
E* 17Q&943 BK2075 PGS95 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
~ 917Z0 ~"ns ,*STRVV,C ,T CH£CKED W,TH 
° -
L
* ^
U
 STATE 0 ? UTAH . . — I ^ - T "^  
-. . - - _ - - - r~~v?.'. r * ' 
•*> U T $ F STAXE.^OAD COMMISSION, : UA« 'tf ^j-jfr-/f 
Plaintiff, AGREES YES ±Z- N 0 -
FINAL ORDER OF CONDEMNATION 
Civil No. 16491 
EDWIN M. HIGLEY and AFTON C. : 
HIGLEY, his wife; KERMIT Project No. I-80N-6(7)46 
BRIMHALL and NAYON BRIMHALL, : Parcel Nos. 49:A, 49:E, 49:2E, 
his wife, 49.-3E, 49:4E, 49:5E and 49:S 
Defendants 
Total Payment: $68,928.04 
It appearing to the court and the court now finds that 
heretofore, on the 4th day of January, 1974, this court made 
13 GZ1 an(3 e n t e r e d ^ts judgment in the above entitled proceeding, 
and said judgment is hereby referred to; and 
o "« It appearing to the court and the court now finds that 
o 
5
 pursuant to the law and the said judgment, the plaintiff did 
3D 
pay said judgment to the defendants Edwin M. Higley and Afton 
6 -§ 
5 £ C. Higley, his wife, Kermit Brimhall and Nayon Brimhall, his 
> <x 
= o wife, together with all interest required by said judgment to 
be paid; and 
It further appearing to the court that the plaintiff 
has made all payments as required by law and order of this court, 
and that this is not a case where any bond was required to be 
given, and all and singular the law in the premises being given 
by the court understood and fully considered, 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
parcels of land hereinafter described are hereby taken and con-
demned in fee simple title as to Parcel Nos. 49:A, 49:S and for 
easement rights as to Parcel Nos. 49:£, 49:2E, 49:3E, 49:4E and 
49:5E, for the purpose described and set forth in the plaintiff's 
complaint, i.e., for the use of the plaintiff, the State of Utah, 
E* 1^034-12 8K230S PG1<S3S 
for highway purposes. DGUG CROFTSr WEBER COUNTY RECORDER J
 16-JAN-G3 442 Pft FEE $.00 OEP JPfl 
REC FORI UTAH.DEPT..OF.TRANSPORTATION 
938 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said 
use is a public use and a use authorized by law. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a 
copy of this final order of condemnation be filed with the county 
recorder of Davis County, State of Utah, and thereupon the 
property interests hereinafter referred to and set forth 
shall vest in fee simple title as to Parcel Nos. 49:A, 49:S 
and for easement rights as to Parcel Nos. 49:E, 49:2E, 49-3E, 49:4E 
and 49:5E, in the plaintiff. The following is a description of 
the property so ordered and condemned as hereinabove provided, 
which is hereby vested" in fee simple title as to Parcel No. 49:A, 
49:S and for easement rights as to Parcel Nos. 49 :E, 49:2E, 49:3E 
49:4E and 49:5E in the plaintiff, all of such property being 
situated in Davis County, State of Utah, and is more particularly 
described as follows: 
Parcel No. 80N-6:49:A 
A parcel of land in fee for a freeway known as Project 
No. 80N-6, being part of an entire tract of property, in the NE^SW% 
of Section 27, T. 5 N., R. 1 W., S.L.B^&M. The boundaries of said 
parcel of land are described as follows: 
Beginning on the easterly line of the SW% of said 
Section 27 at a point 90.0 ft. radially distant southerly from 
the center line of the eastbound lane of said project, which 
point is approximately 1491 ft. northerly from the SE. corner of 
said SW%; thence Northerly 364 ft.; more or less, along said 
easterly line to a point 120.0 ft. radially distant northwesterly 
from the center line of the westbound lane of said project; thence 
Southwesterly 516 ft., more or less, along the arc of a spiral to 
the left which is concentric with and 120.0 ft. radially distant 
northwesterly from an 800.0-foot ten-chord spiral for a 1°00' 
curve to a point opposite Engineer Station 232+00 (Note: Tangent 
to said spiral at its point of beginning bears approximately 
S. 87°26« W.); thence S. 75°49' W. 200.23 ft. to a point 90.0 ft. 
radially distant northwesterly from the center line of said west-
bound lane opposite Engineer Station 230+02.50; thence Southwesterly 
606 ft-," more or less, along the arc of a spiral to the right which 
is concentric with and 90.0.ft. radially distant northwesterly from 
a 1200.0-foot ten-chord spiral for a 2°00' curve to a westerly bound-
ary line of said entire tract (Note: Tangent to last said spiral 
E* 1 9 0 5 * 1 2 BK230S PG1<63<? 
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at its point of beginning bears S. 84°21f W.); thence Southerly 
236 ft., more or less, along said westerly boundary line to a 
southwesterly boundary line of said entire tract; thence S. 85°08' E. 
29.38 ft,; thence N. 88°53' E. 77,93 ft.; thence N. 88°45' E. 
189.76 ft.; thence N. 89c56, E. 499.83 ft. to a point 90.0 ft. 
radially distant southerly from the center line of said eastbound 
lane opposite Engineer Station 2324-00; thence Easterly 511 ft., 
more or less, along the arc of a spiral to the right which is 
concentric with and 90.0 ft. radially distant southerly from an 
800.0-foot ten-chord spiral for a 0°30* curve, (Note: Tangent 
to last said spiral at its point of beginning bears N. 88°56' E.) 
to the point of beginning. The above described parcel of land 
contains 9.01 acres, more or less. 
Together with any and all abutters rights of underlying 
fee to the center of existing rights of way appurtenant to this 
conveyance. 
(Note: GLO Survey Bearing of the south line of said 
Section 27 is rotated 0°15,19" clockwise to match Highway Survey 
Bearings. All bearings and distances in the above description 
are based on the Utah State Plane Coordinate System.) 
Together with any and all rights or easements appurten-
ant* to the remaining portion of said entire tract of property by 
reason of the location thereof with reference to said freeway, 
including, without limiting the foregoing, all rights of ingress 
to or egress from said remaining portion, contiguous to the 
lands hereby conveyed, to or from said freeway. 
Parcel No. 80N-6:49:E 
An easement upon part of an entire tract of property 
in the NE^SW^ of Section 27, T. 5 N., R. 1 W., S.L.B.&M., in 
Davis County, Utah, for the purpose of constructing thereon a 
cut slope and appurtenant parts thereof incident to the con-
struction of a freeway known as Project No. 80N-6. 
Said part of an entire tract is described as follows: 
Beginning on the easterly line of the SW% of said Section 
27 at a point 115.0 ft. radially distant southerly from the center 
line of the eastbound lane of said project, which point is approxi-
mately 1471 ft. northerly from the SE. corner of said SWJj; thence 
Westerly 510 ft., more or less, along the arc of a spiral to the 
left which is ccncentric with and 115.0 ft. radially distant 
southerly frorr. an 500.0-foot ten-chore spiral for a 0330* curve 
to a point optosi'te Er.gir.eer Station 232-00 ,':»"cte: Tar.gsnt to 
said spiral at its point of beginning bears X. S5C28' >»*.); thence 
S. 1°04* E. 46.73 ft.; thence S. 85°08' E. 342.75 ft.; thence 
N. 85°06' E. 168 ft., more or less, to the easterly line of said 
SW%; thence Northerly 65 ft., more or less, along said easterly 
line to" the point of beginning containing 0.75 acre, -more or 
less. 
(Note: GLO Survey Bearing of the south line of said 
Section 27 is rotated 0°15f19" clockwise to match Highway Survey 
E* 1 9 0 5 4 1 2 BK2308 PG164-0 
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B e a r i n g s . All bea r ings and d i s t a n c e s i n the above d e s c r i p -
t i o n are based on the Utah S t a t e Plane Coordinate System.) 
P a r c e l ftp. 80N-6:49:2E 
An easement upon part of an entire tract of property 
in the NE%SW% of Section 27, T. 5 N., R. 1 W., S.L.B.&M., m 
Davis County, Utah, for the purpose of constructing thereon an 
irrigation and utility facility and appurtenant parts thereof 
incident to the construction of a freeway known as Project No. 80N-6. 
Said part of an entire tract is described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 90.0 ft. radially distant southerly 
from the center line of the eastbound lane of said project opposite 
Engineer Station 232-H30, which point is approximately 510 ft, 
westerly along the southerly line of said NE^SW^ and 177 ft. 
northerly along a straight line from the SE. corner of said NE%SW%; 
thence S. 89°56' W. 499.83 ft.; thence S. 88°45' W. 189.76 ft.; 
thence S. 88053' W. 77.93 ft.; thence S. 85o08' E. 286.43 ft.; 
thence N. 89°56' E. 482.62 ft.; thence N. 1°04' W. 30.0 ft. to the 
point of beginning, containing 0.43 acre, more or less. 
(Note: GLO Survey Bearing of the south line of said 
Section 27 is rotated 0°15,19,t clockwise to match Highway Survey 
Bearings. All bearings and distances in the above description 
are based on the Utah State Plane Coordinate System.) 
After irrigation and utility facility is constructed on 
the above described part of an entire tract at the expense of said 
State Road Commission, said State Road Commission is thereafter 
relieved of any further claim or demand for costs, damages or 
maintenance charges which may accrue against said irrigation and 
utility facility and appurtenant parts thereof. 
Parcel No. 80N~6:49;3E 
An easement upon part of an entire tract of property 
in the NE%SW^ of Section 27, T. 5 N., R. 1 W., S.L.B.&M., in" Davis 
County, Utah, for the purpose of constructing thereon an irriga-
tion facility and appurtenant parts thereof incident to the con-
struction of a freeway known as Project No. 80N-6. 
Said part of an entire tract is described as follows: 
3ecmr.ina on the easterly line of the S*wr of said 
Section 2"* at s. print <K>. 3 ft. racially distant scucherlv :rcr. 
the center l;-_* c: t_-^  -> as - bo _- c ;*.-«• :f s-a:: prc;cctr --kir;i rci^: 
5'«'Z7 rr.e-.ce ^sic;/,- III ft., zzzz* :r „s*s. a'.cr.; ir.s a;: :; a 
spiral to zr.c l^ it '*rzcr. is :c-':<-.ir;: ~ith :.r.z ?0.Z :t. rac.allv 
distant scut:.*:./ fro- =r. SC2.:-;cct terser.::: spiral for s." 
0*30' cur/e LC r. ?:ir.: opposite ir.7-ir.fr*r Station 232-00 :;cta: 
Tangent "to said spirai at its pc:r,t zz beair.nina bears aooroxi-
mately N. 89 23' ... )
 ; tnence S..1 34* £. 25.0 ft. to a point 
115.0 ft. radially distant scut.ter.y from the center line of said 
eastbound lane opposite Engineer 5-aca.on 232-i-00? thence Easterly 
510 ft., more or less, along the arc of a spiral to the right which 
£* lS>G!5*i:2 BK230S PG16-4-1 
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is concentric with and 115.0 ft. radially distant southerly 
from an 300.0-foot ten-chord spiral for a 0°30' curve to said 
easterly line of said S~l% (Note: Tangent to last said spiral 
at its point of beginning bears S. 88°56' E.); thence Northerly 
25.0 ft., more or less, along said easterly line to the point 
of beginning, containing 0.29 acre, more or less. 
(Note: GLO Survey Bearing of the south line of said 
Section 27 is rotated 0°15,19" clockwise to match Highway Survey 
Bearings. All bearings and distances in the above description 
are based on the Utah State Plane Coordinate System.) 
After said irrigation facility is constructed on the 
above described part of an entire tract at the expense of said 
State Road Commission, said State Road Commission is thereafter 
relieved of any further claim or demand for costs, damages or 
maintenance charges which may accrue against said irrigation 
facility and appurtenant parts thereof. 
Parcel No. 80N-6:49:4E 
An easement upon part of an entire tract of property in 
the NE*jSW% of Section 27, T. 5 N. , R. 1 W. , S.L.B.&M. , in Davis 
County, Utah, for the purpose of constructing thereon an irriga-
tions.overflow facility and appurtenant parts thereof incident to 
the construction of a freeway known as Project Ho. 80N-6. Said 
part of an entire tract is described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 112.29 ft. radially distant north-
erly from the center line of the westbound lane of said project 
opposite Engineer Station 231+50, which point is approximately 
492 ft, northerly along the easterly line of said NE%SW% and 
565 ft. westerly along a straight line from the SE. corner of 
said OTtffSVrty; thence N. 5°31' W. 77.71 ft.; thence S. 73°11« W. 
25.49 ft.; thence S. 5°31' E. 76.52 ft.; thence N. 75°49' E. 
25.29 ft. to the point of beginning, containing 0.04 acres, more 
or less. 
(Note: GLO Survey Bearing of the south line of said 
Section 27 is rotated 0o15'19" clockwise to match Highway Survey 
Bearings. All bearings and distances in the above description 
are based on the Utah State Plane Coordinate System.) 
The a cove described temporary work, easement snail expire 
upon the-completion of said construction. 
After the irrigation overflow facility is constructed 
on the above described part of an entire tract at the expense 
of said State Road Commission, said State Road Commission is there-
after relieved of any further claim or demand for costs, damages 
E* 19>05-4-i2 BK23QS PG1642 
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or maintenance charges which nay accrue against said irrigation 
overflow facility and appurtenant: parts thereof. 
Parcel So. 8QN-6:49:5E 
An easement upon part of an entire tract of property 
in the NE^SW% of Section 27, T. 5 N. , R. 1 W., S.L.B.&M., in Davis 
County, Utah, for the purpose of constructing thereon an irriga-
tion overflow facility and appurtenant parts thereof incident to 
the construction of a freeway known as Project No. 80N-6. 
Said part of an entire tract is described as follows: 
Beginning on the easterly line of the NE%SW^ of said 
Section 27 at a point 120.0 ft. radially distant northerly from 
the center line of the westbound lane of said project; thence 
Northerly 135 ft., more or less, along said easterly line to a 
northerly line of Davis County which is the center of the Weber 
River; thence Westerly 17 ft., more or less, along said northerly 
line of Davis County and said center of the Weber River to a point 
of intersection with a radial line extending northerly from the 
center line of said westbound lane opposite Engineer Station 
237+00; thence S. 2°37' E. 135 ft., more or less, to a point 
120.0 ft. radially distant northerly from the center line of said 
westbound lane opposite Engineer Station 237+00; thence Easterly 
10 ft., more or less, along the arc of a spiral to the right which 
is concentric with and 120.0 ft. radially distant northerly from 
an 800.0-foot ten-chord spiral for a 1°00' curve (Note: Tangent 
to said spiral at its point of beginning bears N. 87°23' E.) to 
the point of beginning, containing 0.04 acre, more or less. 
ALSO: 
A temporary work easement to facilitate the construction 
of said irrigation facility and appurtenant parts thereof, being 
upon a parcel of land 25.0 ft. wide, adjoining westerly the 
westerly side line of the above described easement, containing 
0.08 acre, more or less. 
The above described temporary work easement shall expire 
upon the completion of said construction. 
(Note: GLO Survey Bearing of the South line of said 
Section 27 is rotated 0o15'19" clockwise, to match Highway Survey 
Bearings. All bearings and distances in the above description are 
based on the Utah State Plane Coordinate System.) 
After irrigation overflow facility is constructed on 
the above describee part of ar. cr.tira tract at the e:-:per.se of 
said State Road Cortrissicn. said State ?,oai Ccmnissicn is there-
after relieved of any furtr.er ciairr. or demand for costs, damages 
or maintenance charges which ray accrue against said irrigation 
overflow facility and appurtenant parts thereof. 
Parcel No. 80N-6:49:S 
A parce l of land in fee, being a severed p o r t i o n of an 
e n t i r e t r a c t of p rope r ty lying in Davis and Weber C o u n t i e s , being 
i* 190254-12 PK23QS PG1<£4.3 
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all of the NE^ SW^ j of Section 27, T. 3 N., R. 1 W. , S.L.E.&M. 
lying north of a freeway known as Project No. I-80N-6(7)46. The 
boundaries of said tract are described as follows-. 
Beginning at the NE. corner of said NE^ SWij; thence South 
757 ft. along the east boundary line of said NE%SW% to the northerly 
no-access line of said freeway; thence Westerly along said no-access 
line the following three (3) courses: Southwesterly 516 ft., more 
or less, along the arc of a spiral to the left which is concentric 
with and 120.0 ft. radially distant northerly from an 800.0-foot 
ten-chord spiral for a 1°00' curve to a point opposite Engineer 
Station 2324-00 Westbound Lane (Note: Tangent to said spiral at 
its point of beginning bears approximately S. 87°26< W.); thence 
S. 75°49' W. 200.23 ft. to a point 90.0 ft. radially distant north-
westerly from the center line of said westbound lane opposite 
Engineer Station 230+02.50; thence Southwesterly 606 ft., more 
or less, along the arc of a spiral to the right which is concentric 
with and 90.0 ft. radially distant northwesterly from a 1200.0-foot 
ten-chord spiral for a 2°00' curve, to a west boundary line of said 
tract of land (Note: Tangent to last said spiral at its point of 
beginning bears s. 84°21' W„) ; thence North 190 ft. along said 
west boundary line to the Davis and Weber County line; thence 
West 25 ft. to the west line of said NE%SW%; thence North 723 ft. 
along said west line to the NW. corner of said NE^SW^; thence East 
1323, ft., more or less, along the north line of said NE%SW% to the 
point of beginning. The above described tract of land contains 25.22 
acres', more or less. 
Dated this ^ / <>• day of ^ g y ^ ^ ^ ^ f ,1974. 
\ 
x$\ .£-~jg/s: s#* 
DISTRICT JUDGE/ 
- V VVAXKP1 Ca«„^ Clerk .n<* & .rffjd. C Wk •* »K. DMHef 
~ J J-o i D,t*, c* of rh, Sf«f. *f UUK rn W for fh. Counry 
« o np.r.d w,fh <£ «*,„«#! fh»r*rf m . f r'«o N'^TEulffiT* 
«N WITNESS WHEREOF. | L v , ,.r«,nta . . /my kuS 
«mi offieWjw*! M <^J"««y «f i . ^ ^ — . l f T j L > . u 
P I . . . <-V* 
Orf9?n«l F M 
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APPENDIX 7 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARK KAPPOS and 
MALAKAPPOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
otf tf w 
DECISION 
VS. o 
o 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant. 
Judge: W. Brent WestP. 
Case: 060902775 " 
Clerk: Pamela Allen o 
CD 
IS3 
"0 
o ro 
o 
CD ^O 
The Defendant's Motion to Revise the Court's Order Regarding the Plaintiffs' 
Constitutional Takings Claim from Without Prejudice to Prejudice is denied. This case has been 
litigated piecemeal and the Court has been asked to review legal issue after legal issue without 
the benefit of any evidence or testimony. Admittedly, the Court's prior Ruling on the Plaintiffs' 
Constitutional Taking Claims is ambiguous. But, so were the Plaintiffs' initial pleadings. With 
very little help in analysis, from the Plaintiffs in regards to their claims, the Court was left to 
guess as to the Plaintiffs theories of recovery. The Court, guessing that the issue of mistake 
might in some way shape or form be part of the Plaintiffs' Constitutional Taking Claim, 
dismissed that claim without prejudice. It was anticipated, by the Court, that the Plaintiffs would 
file an amended complaint clarifying their claim or theory of recovery. The Plaintiffs did file an 
amended complaint clarifying their Constitutional Takings Claim. The issues raised by the 
Plaintiffs in their amended complaint and in their response to the Defendant's motion are 
sufficient to deny the Defendant's Motion. DECISION - DEFENDANTS MOTION TO REVISE THE O 
vmnnftfifiift 
Page two 
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Case 060902775 
The Plaintiffs' counsel will please prepare an Order, consistent with this Ruling. 
Dated this 26th day of October 2009. 
to. fcfefe§ 
Judge W. Brent West 
Second District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the "Z^J day of October, 2009,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Decision to the parties as follows: 
M. Darin Hammond 
4723 Harrison Blvd Ste 200 
OgdenUt 84403 
Gary D. Josephson 
Assistant Attorney General 
PO Box 140857 
Salt Lake City Ut 84114-0857 
Deputy Clerk 
APPE^DIX8 
DECISjON - DEFENDANrS AP, 
VD24346982 pages: 3 
060902775 STATE OF UTA DEPT OF TRANS 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARK KAPPOS, and 
MALA KAPPOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant. 
MARK KAPPOS and 
MALA KAPPOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant. 
DECISION 
FILED 
J U N - 9 2008 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
Judge: W. Brent West 
Clerk: Pamela Allen 
Case: 060902775 
JUN-9 
The Defendant's Second Motion for a Partial Judgment on the Pleadings is granted. In its 
Kappos I decision, this Court ruled that a quiet title cause of action will not support a request for 
damages as a matter of law. That principle applies equally as well in Kappos II Therefore, the 
damage portion of the quiet title claim in Kappos His dismissed with prejudice. 
A ruling on damages in this quiet title action is not premature. The legal principle is 
constant and is not dependent upon the filing of an appropriate notice of claim. Failure to file a 
notice of claim for damages is not the reason the damage claim was dismissed in Kappos II It 
Page two 
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Case 060902775 
was dismissed because damages are simply not available in a traditional quiet title claim. 
In addition, immunity from the Plaintiffs damage claim has not been waived by the 
Defendant. The logic of Tindlev v Salt Lake City School District 116 P.3d 295 (Utah 2005) is 
dispositive. The Defendant, by recording it's notice of interest, was engaged in a governmental 
function. 
The Defendant has not waived its immunity for damages in a quiet title action, which 
damages couldn't be awarded anyway. The takings provision does not apply because the Plaintiff 
has not alleged a constitutional cause of action and finally, the general waiver for employee 
negligence does not apply in this instance. 
Defense counsel will please prepare an Order, consistent with this Ruling. 
Dated this 6th day of June, 2008. 
Judge W. Brent West 
Second District Court 
Page two 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the M "" day of June, 2008,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Decision to the parties as follows: 
REED STRINGHAM 
GARYJOSEPHSON 
PO BOX 140856 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0856 
M DARIN HAMMOND 
4723 HARRISON BLVD STE 200 
OGDENUT 84403 
APPENDIX 9 
STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 900 
Section 
63-30d-9(H- Indemnification of governmental entity by em-
ployee not required. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
63-30d-l01* Title, scope, and intent. 
(1) This chapter is known as the "Governmental Immunity 
Act of Uf^'" 
(2) (a) '^ne waivers and retentions of immunity found in 
this chapter apply to all functions of government, no 
matfer how labeled. 
(bj This single, comprehensive chapter governs all 
claiii18 against governmental entities or against their 
emp}oyees or agents arising out of the performance of the 
empJ°yee,s duties, within the} scope of employment, or 
undtfr c0*01" °f authority. 2004 
63-30d-l02' Definitions. 
As
 u s e d in this chapter: 
(Ij "Claim" means any asserted demand for or cause of 
actio11 *°r money or damages, whether arising under the 
common law, under state constitutional provisions, or 
xm&0T state statutes, against a governmental entity or 
against an employee in the employee's personal capacity. 
(2) (a) "Employee* includes: 
(i) a governmental entity's officers, employees, 
servants, trustees, or commissioners; 
\i\> mem\>eYs oi a governing \>ony*, 
(iii) members of a government entity board; 
(iv) members of a government entity commis-
sion; 
(v) members of an advisory body, officers, and 
employees of a Children's Justice Center created 
in accordance with Section 67-5b-104; 
(vi) student teachers holding a letter of autho-
rization in accordance with Sections 53A-6-103 
and 53A-6-104; 
(vii) educational aides; 
(viii) students engaged in providing services to 
members of the public in the course of an ap-
proved ^medical, nursing, or other professional 
health care clinical training program; 
(ix) volunteers as denned by Subsection 67-20-
2(3); and 
(x) tutors. 
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identi-
fied in Subsection (2)(a), whether or not the individ-
ual holding that position receives compensation. 
(c) "Employee" does not include an independent 
contractor. 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its 
political subdivisions as both are defined in this section. 
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means each activity, 
undertaking, or operation of a governmental entity. 
(b) "Governmental function" includes each activity, 
undertaking, or operation performed by a depart-
ment, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a govern-
mental entity. 
(c) "Governmental function" includes a govern-
mental entity's failure to act. 
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to 
o r loss of property, or any other injury that a person may 
suffer to his person or estate, that would be actionable if 
inflicted by a private person or his agent. 
(6) Tersonal injury" means an injury of any kind other 
thaU property damage. 
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, 
s c n 0 ( ) l district, public transit district, redevelopment 
a g e n c y , special improvement or taxing district, special 
district an entity created by an interlocal agreement 
adopted! under Title 11, Chapter 13, Interlocal Cooper* 
fcon Act, or other governmental subdivision or public 
corp^r a^o n-
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any 
righk title, estate, or interest in real or personal property. 
(91 "State" means the state of Utah, and includes each 
office department, division, agency, authority, commis-
sion* board, institution, hospital, college, university, Chil-
dren's Justice Center, or other instrumentality of the 
statf-
(]0) "Willful misconduct" means the intentional doing 
of a wrongful act, or the wrongful failure to act, without 
just cause or excuse, where the actor is aware that his 
conduct will probably result in injury. 2004 
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( ^ V E R N M E N T A L IMMUNITY — STATEMENT, 
SCOPE, AND EFFECT 
63-30d-^®I* Immuni ty of governmenta l ent i t i e s from 
suit. 
(1) Except as m a v te otherwise provided in this chapter, 
each g o V e m m e n t a l entity and each employee of a governmen-
tal entity a r e hnmune from suit for any injury that results 
from thtf exercise of a governmental function. 
(2) N^ t w ^^ n s t a n a ^ n 6 the w a i v e r of immunity provisions of 
Section 63-30d-301, a governmental entity, its officers, and its 
employee s a r e immune from suit for any injury or damage 
resulting fr°m t n e implementation of or the failure to imple-
ment m ^ ^ e s to: 
(#) control the causes of epidemic and communicable 
diseases and other conditions significantly affecting the 
public health or necessary to protect the public health as 
s e t out in Title 26A, Chapter 1, Local Health Depart-
ments; 
(p) investigate and control suspected bioterrorism and 
d i s £ a s e a s set out in Title 26, Chapter 23b, Detection of 
Public Health Emergencies Act; and 
(<•) respond to a national, state, or local emergency, a 
public health emergency as defined in Section 26-23b~102, 
o r 0. declaration by the President of the United States or 
oth#r federal official requesting public health related 
activities. 2004 
63-30d-202. Act provisions not construed as admission 
or denial of liability — Effect of waiver of 
immunity — Exclusive remedy — Joinder of 
employee — Limitations on personal liability. 
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifi-
cally provided, may be construed as an admission or 
d e n ia l of liability or responsibility by or for a governmen-
tal entity or its employees. 
(p) YL immunity from suft is waived. \)y t m s dnapter, 
consent to be sued is granted, and liability of the entity 
shall be determined as if the entity were a private person. 
* (c) No cause of action or basis of liability is created by 
any waiver of immunity in this chapter, nor may any 
provision of this chapter be construed as imposing strict 
liafculty or absolute liability. 
(2) N 0 t n m £ m this chapter may be construed as adversely 
affecting ^ y immunity from suit that a governmental entity 
or employee may otherwise assert under state or federal law. 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(c), an action 
under this chapter against a governmental entity for an 
injury caused by an act or omission that occurs during the 
performance of an employee's duties, within the scop£ °* 
employment, or under color of authority is a piainti**s 
exclusive remedy. 
(b) Judgment under this chapter against a governmen~ 
tal entity is a complete bar to1 any action by the claims1** 
based upon the same subject matter, against the emplovee 
(c) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any civil ac^10n 
• or proceeding based upon the same subject matter aga*nst 
the employee or the estate of the employee whose ac* o r 
omission gave rise to the claim, unless: 
(i) the employee acted or failed to act throu&n 
fraud or willful misconduct; 
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the em~ 
ployee driving a vehicle, or being in actual phy^ca* 
control of a vehicle: 
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal iP o r 
greater by weight than the established le&al 
limit; 
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or a n 5 r 
drug to a degree that rendered the person inca-
pable of safely driving the vehicle; or 
(C) while under the combined influence of *!• 
cohol and any drug to a degree that rendered ^n e 
person incapable of safely driving the vehicle 
(hi) injury or damage resulted from the empl0vee 
being physically or mentally impaired so as tP De 
unable to reasonably perform his or her job runtf*1011 
because of: 
(A) the use of alcohol; 
(B) the nonprescribed use of a controlled £UD~ 
stance as defined in. Section 58-37-4*, or 
(C) the combined influence of alcohol aP& a 
nonprescribed controlled substance as defined by 
Section 58-37-4; or , 
<iv) in a judicial or administrative proceeding* ^n e 
employee intentionally or knowingly gave, up^n a 
lawful oath or in any form allowed by law && a 
substitute for an oath, false testimony m a t e r i a l ^ t n e 
issue or matter of inquiry under this section. 
(4) Except as permitted in Subsection (3Xc), no employee 
may be joined or held personally liable for acts or omis0*ons 
occurring: 
(a) during the performance of the employee's dutiesJ 
(b) within the scope of employment; or 
(c) under color of authority. 2004 
63-30d-203. Exemptions for certain takings actions-
An action that involves takings law, as defined in Se^^o n 
€3-84-13r is not subject to the requirements .of Section^ 63-
30d-401, 63-30d-402, 63-30d-403, and 63-30d-6Ql. 2004 
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WAIVERS OF IMMUNITY 
63-30d-301. Waivers of immunity -*- Exceptions. 
<(1) (a) Immunity'from suit of each governmental entity i s 
waived as to any contractual obligation. 
(b) Actions arising out of contractual rights or obliga-
tions are not subject to the requirements of Sections 
63-30d-401, 63-30d-402, 63-30d-403, or 63-30d-601. 
(c) The Division of Water Resources is not liable for 
failure to deliver water from a reservoir or a s so r t ed 
facility authorized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear # i v e r 
Development Act, if the failure to deliver the con t ra^^ 1 
amount of water is due to drought, other natural condi-
tion, or-safety condition that causes a deficiency in *n e 
amount of available water. 
(2) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity 
waived: 
(a) as to any action brought to recover, obtain pos£* 
sion of, or quiet title to real or personal property; 
(b) as to any action brought to foreclose mortgage,3 
other Hens on real or personal property, to determine P1 
adverse claim on teal or ^ er^oual^mjier^ot to obtain * 
adjudication about any mortgage or other Hen that ^ 
governmental entity may have or claim'on rfeal or P* 
sonal property, 
(c) as to any action based on the negligent destrucf^0 
damage, or loss of goods, merchandise, or other prop01" 
while it is in the possession of any governmental entity( 
employee, if the property was seized for the purpo$e 
forfeiture under any provision of state law; 
(d) subject to Subsection 63-30d-302(l), as to any a 
tion brought under the authority of Article I, Section 22, < 
the Utah Constitution, for the recovery of compens^0 
from the governmental entity when the governmtf11^ 
entity has taken or damaged private property for p ^ 1 
uses without just compensation; 
(e) subject to Subsection 63-30d-302(2), as to any a<*io 
brought to recover attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2"40 
and 63-2-802; 
(f) for actual damages under Title 67, Chapter 21, tJtal 
Protection of Public Employees Act; or 
(g) as to any action brought to obtain relief from a km 
use regulation that imposes a substantial burden or> th< 
free exercise of religion under Title 63, Chapter 90b, t-Jtal 
Religious Land Use Act. 
j[3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), immiP11^ 
from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to a n5 
injury caused by: 
(i) a defective, unsafe, or dangerous conditio11 °^  
any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, s ide^a^j 
culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure 
located on them; or 
(ii) any defective or dangerous condition of a public 
building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public 
improvement, 
(b) Immunity is not waived if the injury arises out °f>m 
connection with, or results from: 
(i) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition 
of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, side-
walk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other gtinc-
ture located on them; or 
(ii) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition 
of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir or 
other public improvement. 
(4) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is 
waived as to any injury proximately caused by a neglige*** a c* 
or omission of an employee committed within the scop6 0I" 
employment. 
(5) Immunity is not waived under Subsections (3) and W) if 
the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from: 
(a) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exer-
cise or perform, a discretionary function, whether o** n o* 
the discretion is abused; 
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false ajrest, 
malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse ci pro-
cess, libel, slander, deceit, interference with coflfr^t 
rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of cfrU 
rights; 
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation °£ o r 
by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, 
any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, Or &&&&* 
authorization; 
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making a n 
inadequate or negligent inspection; 
902 
(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or 
administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without 
probable cause; 
(f) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not 
it is negligent or intentional; 
(g) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, 
mob violence, jand civil disturbances; 
(h) the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(i) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(j) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, 
county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
(k) any natural condition on publicly owned or con-
trolled lands, any condition existing in connection with an 
abandoned mine or mining operation, or any activity 
authorized by the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire, and State 
Lands; 
(1) research or implementation of cloud management or 
seeding for the clearing of fog; 
(m) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or 
natural disasters; 
(n) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or 
storm systems; 
(o) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being 
driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 
41-6a-208; 
(p) the activities of: 
(i) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(ii) fighting fire; 
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous 
materials or hazardous wastes; 
(iv) emergency evacuations; 
(v) transporting or removing injured persons to a 
place where emergency medical assistance can be 
rendered or where the person can be transported by a 
licensed ambulance service; or 
(vi) intervening during dam emergencies; 
(q) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exer-
cise or perform, any function pursuant to Title 73, Chap-
ter 10, Board of Water Resources — Division of Water 
Resources; or 
(r) unauthorized access to government records, data, or 
electronic information systems by any person or entity. 
2005 
63-30d-302. Specific remedies — "Takings" actions —-
Government Records Access and Manage-
ment Actions. 
(1) In any action brought under the authority of Article I, 
Section 22, of the Utah Constitution for the recovery of 
compensation from the governmental entity when the govern-
mental entity has taken or damaged private property for 
public uses without just compensation, compensation and 
damages shall be assessed according to the requirements of 
Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain. 
(2) (a) Notwithstanding Section 63-30d-401, a notice of 
claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection 63-30d-
301(2Xe) may be filed contemporaneously with a petition 
for review under Section 63-2-404. 
(b) The provisions of Subsection 63-30d-403(l), relat-
ing to the governmental entity's response to a claim, and 
the provisions of 63-30d-601, requiring an undertaking, 
do not apply to a notice of claim for attorneys' fees filed 
contemporaneously with a petition for review under Sec-
tion 63-2-404. 
(c) Any other claim under this chapter that is related to 
a claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection 63-30d-
301(2Xe) may be brought contemporaneously with the 
claim for attorneys' fees or in a subsequent action. 2004 
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NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST A GOVERNMENTAL 
ENTITY OR A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE 
63-30d-401. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — 
Service — Legal disability — Appointment of 
guardian ad litem. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (1Kb), a claim 
arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if 
the claim were against a private person begins to ^ rutn, 
(b) The statute of limitations does not begin to run 
until a claimant knew, or with the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have known: 
(i) that the claimant had a claim against the gov-
ernmental entity or its employee; and 
(ii) the identity of the governmental entity or the 
name of the employee. 
(c) The burden to prove the exercise of reasonable 
diligence is upon the claimant. 
(2) Any person having a claim against a governmental 
entity, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of the employee's duties, within the 
scope of employment, or under color of authority shall file a 
written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an 
action, regardless ofwhether or not the function giving rise to 
the claim is characterized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as 
they are known; and 
(iv) if the claim is being pursued against a govern-
mental employee individually as provided in Subsec-
tion 63-30d-202(3)(c), the name of the employee, 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that 
person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian; 
and 
(ii) directed and delivered by hand or by mail 
according to the requirements of Section 68-3-8.5 to 
the office of 
(A) the city or town clerk, when the claim is 
against an incorporated city or town; 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against 
a county; 
(C) the superintendent or business adminis-
trator of the board, when the claim is against a 
school district or board of education; 
(D) the presiding officer or secretary/clerk of 
the board, when the claim is against a special 
district; , 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is 
against the State of Utah; 
(F) a member of the governing board, the 
executive director, or executive secretary, when 
the claim is against any other public board, 
commission, or body; or 
(G) the agent authorized by a governmental 
entity to receive the notice of claim by the gov-
ernmental entity under Subsection (5Xe). 
(4) (a) If an injury that may reasonably be expected to 
result in a claim against a governmental entity is sus-
tained by a claimant who is under the age of majority or 
mentally incompetent, that governmental entity may file 
a request with the court for the appointment of a guardian 
ad litem for the potential claimant. 
(b) If a guardian ad litem is appointed, the time for 
filing a claim under Section 63-30d-402 begins when the 
order appointing the guardian is issued. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARK KAPPOS and MALA KAPPOS, 
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OF TRANSPORTATION, 
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SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
The Plaintiffs' Motion to File an Amended Complaint or to Reinstate their Claim for a 
Constitutional Taking is denied. First, the Court agrees with the Plaintiffs in that their motion is 
timely. However, the Court finds the case of Steiner v. State, 27 Utah 2d 284,495 P.2d 809 
(1972) dispositive on the procedural merits. An order of dismissal is a final adjudication and 
thereafter a complaint cannot be amended. Although these claims were dismissed, without 
prejudice, they were dismissed. This case is otherwise completed. Although the Plaintiffs' 
argument about judicial economy makes a great deal of sense, it appears that their remedy is to 
file a new complaint, if they desire to proceed on this claim. 
Counsel for the State of Utah will please prepare a short Order, consistent with this 
ruling. 
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